Introduction
It has been more than fi ve years since the fall of Lehman Brothers 2 , i.e. fi ve years since the fi nancial crisis has broken not only in the United States. Governments particularly in Western countries responded with full guarantee of deposits and with the fi nancial injections into institutions that were in their opinion "too big to fail", because their collapse could threaten the whole fi nancial system stability. Herewith the banks defaults were warded off but the measures have signifi cantly increased the government defi cits. Th erefore in order not to let the countries go "bankrupt" bonds. Although on the issue in question there has been written a lot, the real question is whether the appropriate measures, which could prevent similar crisis in the future, has been implemented. Due to the fi nancial world globalization and "spillover eff ect" of problems among economic sectors and countries we wouldn´t probably fi nd a sector where the term crisis is not infl ected. Despite it at present there are opinions that the fi nancial crisis has been warded off and now it is necessary to ward off the debt one. Although the premise on the debt crisis existence can be accepted, in my opinion, not even the fi nancial crisis has been warded off . In this respect we have to mention in particular the process in the European Union and the United States. Provided we would want to accept the premise on the fi nancial crisis warding off , perhaps it could be so done only in the United States, but even there with reservations. In my opinion it cannot be said on Europe even with reservations. Although I have stated that the whole world experiences the fi nancial and economic crises, it cannot be utterly generalized.
Among individual countries or more precisely mainly among regions there we can see theoretical and practical diff erences in approach. As I have already mentioned my comparison will be dealing with the United States and the European Union. Th e reason is the cultural and economic similarity. Also in sociopolitical establishment there can be found similarities despite the fact that the United States are the federation while Europe is created with the unitary states. Th at is to say that Europe is walking by leaps and bounds to quasi federative system or system of confederacy, if it already did not. Th us the United States can be certainly used as the suitable inspiration for the newly formed federative Europe.
Th e European Union proposal
Since the beginning of crisis the European Union has prepared many initiatives in an eff ort to solve related problems. However the initiatives have appeared before the arisen crisis, nevertheless with respect to very signifi cant economic boom many of them were not accepted. 5 As the fi rst measure responding to the economic crisis we can mark the establishment of European System of Financial Supervisors (hereinaft er "ESFS") 6 in January 2011. Although there has been created a broad institutional framework In this Report there is stated that a stable and prosperous European Monetary Union (hereaft er "EMU") has to be based on four principles, which are:
1. Integrated fi nancial system 2. Unifi ed budget system 3. Integrated economic policy 4. Democratic legitimacy and accountability Th ese conclusions were also supported by the representatives from the Eurozone countries 10 and they called upon the European Commission to prepare a legislative proposal. Th e proposal was announced in the Communication EP from September 12 th 2012, which is known as "A Roadmap towards a Banking Union" 11 .
Newly created banking union ought to be based on four pillars, as follows:
1. Common regulatory rules 12 7 "Suomen Pankki" 8 "Report of the European Commission's High-level Expert Group on Bank Structural Reform" Basic recommendations are: 1) Separation of particularly risky activities from the current deposit 2) Strengthening of the supervisor´s powers 3) Greater protection for savers during the institution 4) Increased capital requirements for the risky activities. 9 Th is is regular meeting of euro zone fi nance ministers. Th e main goal is the care for Euro and the assets of the European Monetary Union. 10 "Th e Commission will shortly submit proposals of the single supervisory mechanism based on article 127, par 6. Due to the urgency we ask the Commission to judge the proposal until the end of the year 2012. As soon as the eff ective single supervisory mechanism involving ECB will be established, under proper decision ESM could have the chance to recapitalize the banks in eurozone directly". Th e diff erence in adjustment of deposits insurance systems as well as absence of a unifi ed resolution framework according to the explanatory memorandum represents the obstacle for creation or functioning of the single internal market. Adding the economic crisis in progress and the general weakening of the trust not only into the credit institutions , it seems to be for the European Union more than necessary to take the steps for saving or rather even recovering the credibility of the whole fi nancial system. Concerning these issues the countries oft en proceed according to their own meaning and hurriedly implemented various measures to prevent a panic and therewith connected runs on the credit institutions. So far the directive from the year 2009
13 is the latest eff ective initiative.
Although the system is harmonized, the unifi cation concept in all countries of the European Union is constantly more and more discussed and instead of harmonization there can be seen an eff ort to come to a direct regulation 14 . In the explanatory memorandum of the proposed regulation there is stated that the existence of more than forty various deposit insurance systems (hereaft er "systems") on the European Union´s territory is the predominant problem and further also their underfunding. To solve these particular problems in the text there are stated the following measures:
1. Simplifi cation of the existing adjustment 2. Shortening of the maturity period and improvement of reporting obligations 3. Increase of the fi nancial systems capacity 4. Borrowing facilities, i.e. the possibility to transfer the funds between the systems of individual countries Th e proposal stems from article 47, paragraph 2 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereaft er "TFEU"), which is the legal basis for the adoption of measures the purpose of which is to create the internal market within the fi nancial services. More clear specifi cation of the deposits defi nition is a positive aspect of the proposal. According to this proposal only instruments payable in entire extent can be considered as the deposits, i.e. not structured products, certifi cates or credit bonds. Th is prevents the systems from unnecessary investment risks. In addition all systems have to be subjected to continuous supervision and have to conduct regularly the exercise tests of all systems. Th e member states are also expressly authorized for the mergers of the Deposit Guarantee Schemes.
From the insurance there are obligatorily excluded deposits predominantly of the public authorities and fi nancial institutes of any type, which has been modifi ed as the facultative possibility so far.
On the contrary at present the deposits of non-fi nancial companies and deposits in other currencies that are currencies of the member states are considered as the obligatory insured.
Although the maximum amount of insurance is not changing in the proposal there is explicitly stated the possibility to agree higher limit but only in specifi c cases and for a limited time. 15 Th ere is also signifi cant reduction in time for deposit withdrawals. Currently the Directive requires the member states to ensure deposit withdrawals within 20 days from the moment when the system is notifi ed on the institution bankruptcy. Th e proposed adjustment envisages with gradual period shortening up to fi nal 7 days, but right up until the year 2024.
In the regulation there is also set out quite new way of the systems funding, consisting of four phases, whereas not all are obligatory, only their order is.
Firstly aft er the transitional period of ten years the systems have to dispose with the sum in amount of 1, 5 % of eligible deposits. Only if it appears in connection with the institution bankruptcy that these funds are insuffi cient, the second phase is going to turn up.
Th is one insists in ex post obligation of all institutions of the state in question to settle extraordinary contributions, namely up to the amount of 0, 5 % of eligible deposits.
16 Th e proposed conception draft ed here is the compromise result of theoretical considerations if it is better to fi nance the systems ex post or ex ante, 17 thus the funds in the proposed model settled ex ante amount to ¾ of the fund volume, while those settled ex post amount to ¼.
Th irdly the borrowing facility enables the system, which lacks the funds, to secure a loan from all other systems of the deposits insurance in the EU. Th ose 15 For instance deposits coming from real estate transactions but for a maximum of 12 months. 16 However there is the possibility for the supervisory authorities to release the institution from this obligation namely in case that the payment could threaten it. 17 See more at: Funding of Deposit Insurance Systems. In: [online] . [cit. 2014-02-13].
Available at: http://www.iadi.org/docs/funding%20fi nal%20guidance%20paper%206_ may_2009.pdf ones are even obliged to provide the funds in case of necessity namely even without delay up to the amount of 0, 5 % of their eligible deposits. Th e systems of individual countries will subscribe to the contribution relatively according to the amount of their eligible deposits.
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For the purpose to ensure repayment, these systems are entitled to enter into the depositors´ claims on behalf of the institution being in bankruptcy. Th e last chance how to save deposits of the troubled institutions is the alternative fi nancing in case there is a lack of the funds from the previous steps. However the funding through the ECB is expressly prohibited.
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But this mechanism will start its implementation aft er ten years, i.e. when the systems will be fi lled with the needed liquidity. Primarily the system´s funds should be used for the depositors´ redemption. But this does not protect to use them for the problem solution in accordance with the subvention rules. In order to avoid the funds depletion on account of the bank´s uninsured creditors, this way of the funds utilization has to be limited.
In this respect the interconnection with the fund for the banks´ problem solution will be important, i.e. with the so called third pillar. In my opinion the separation of these pillars itself is problematic, because they both are signifi cantly interconnected. Th is fact strengthens even the reality that in comparison with the original proposal the European Deposit Insurance Fund has been excluded from the proposal and replaced with the above mentioned system of borrowing facilities. Th is leads to a very close conjunction with the fund which ought to be established in the framework of the Single Resolution Mechanism (hereaft er "SRM"). Th e essence is that if a credit institution despite the Single Supervision Mechanism (hereaft er "SSM") being newly under control of ECB fi nds itself in serious problems, there will be a single and in advance specifi ed procedure, which will prevent the uncontrolled defaults. Th e ECB notice will be the releasing mechanism that the bank has serious fi nancial diffi culties. Th e regulation also counts with the possibility that the troubled institutions will "sign up" themselves. Th e specifi c solution ought to be prepared by the Committee 20 , but the formal decision making has to be under control of the European Commission. Th ere has to be the support of primary law to establish a body with the decisionmaking power. With respect to the consentaneity principle to be applied for the primary law changes, it is very unlikely to fi nd political will for such a change in particular in Germany and Nordic countries, because their defi cits are, at least in comparison with the south of Europe, relatively low. Because the SRM regulation is the secondary legal act, it cannot create new power beyond the framework of the founding treaties.
18 Th e Regulation determines fi ve year maturity period under assumption that the system will obtain the funds for its payment through the selection of new contributions. 19 See Article 123 TFEU. 20 Th e committee should be composed of representatives of the European Commission, central banks, where the problematic banks have its residence, branch offi ces and subsidiaries.
Th is is the reason why as the legal basis has been marked article 114, par 1 21 of the TFEU, relating to the internal market. Th e foundation of the fund, which ought to be funded by contributions of the banking sector, is a part of this mechanism 22 . Th e amount would be based on the bank´s risk profi le, whereas the riskiness would be judged by the European Union. But the question is, if this construction does not contradict with the article 114, par 2 of TFEU. In this article there is stated that article 114, par 1 23 cannot be used for the provisions relating to taxes, nevertheless "contribution of banking sector", in my opinion, can be subsumed under the term tax. Th is would mean that the regulation in question cannot be the execution of the article 114 of TFEU and thus it has no reliance in the primary law.
In addition to the fund adjustment I see the fund´s volume as very problematic. Th e funds will be, in my opinion, also insuffi cient for the banks´ capitalization leaving alone the settlement of claims for the insured deposits. With regard to the ratio of the bank's balance sheets to the countries´ GDP, 55 billion is the very conservative estimate. Some estimates indicate that the European banks will need 50 billion for "cleaning", but others even 900 billion Euros. 24 I think that currently nobody can state this with certainty mainly with respect to distrust concerning the bank balance sheets of the European institutions.
25 Th erefore ECB has been empowered to perform so called "Comprehensive assessment Analysis" 26 , i.e. stress tests. Th ese should be completed in November 2014 i.e. at the time when ECB will take over the tasks in the fi eld of single supervision. Th e tests themselves should assess all of the bank assets, i.e. even so called non-performing loans 27 , restructured loans but also exposures towards foreign countries. [cit. 2014-01-29]. Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/16/eurozonestresstests-estimate-dUSL5N0KQ2BR20140116 25 It's more than obvious if you looked at the market and book values of 10 biggest euro-area banks. Th eir market to book value ratio is 54.9 % in comparison with 97.5 % in the top 10 United States banks. 26 Empowerment contains article 33, par 4 COUNCIL REGULATION, through which the central bank is entrusted with special tasks concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of the credit institutions COM (2012) 511 27 Th at means loans approaching to default, e.g. according to IMF they are loans 90 and more days overdue. But this criterion is problematic because the term "non-performing loan" is not defi ned in the European legislation.
Probably the biggest problem, which ECB will have to cope with, is the rating of the government bonds especially of the southern wing of Europe 28 . Th e actual ECB testing has, in my opinion, one basic defi cit.
Tests, which ECB has started in the last year, stem from the actual capital definitions especially in this respect important defi nition of indicator Tier 1. However given the eff ectiveness of so called "CRD IV Package" 29 ,this capital will be defi ned more strictly since January 2015 30 , and therefore the banks will not be able to include some of the current items into it. Th us the evaluation results will be distorted. In addition in the course of testing it is necessary to hold Tier 1 capital on at least 6 % 31 threshold, although from the next year the percentage ratio will increase, and the banks will have to hold it at 8 %. Th erefore the question is how the data, now collected and assessed by ECB, will be relevant. Moreover it is interesting to note that even in October of the last year ECB declared that the threshold 8 % is needed, because its observance reveals all possible types of risks that may arise in the future. Available at: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-10-23/ecb-applies-8-capital-buff erto-124-banks-in-asset-test.html 33 During stress tests EBA has been specifi ed, that even at the worst scenario that may arise, the capital value of tier 1 doesn´t drop under 12 %, which makes Dexia the most safety bank in Europe. Dexia then, based on the report of EBA, has received rating as high as possible, i.e. AAA. But at about two months later due to the huge losses on Greek bonds the bank has been saved from default only with "government injection " in amount of 4 billion Euros.
there is to be considered what has already been proposed, i.e. creation of one union fund for all institutions and depositors within the whole territory of the European Union.
At theoretical level I suppose that the interconnectivity will be very important or if you like clarifi cation of relationships among the systems and SRM. Namely in the situation when the European Deposit Guarantee Scheme will be mandatory within the all of "twenty eight", while SRM will be mandatory only in the countries the currency of which is Euro, or in the countries that will join the banking union voluntarily. I am also sceptical towards ex post fi nancing, although only the relative one. Namely it may be presumed the doubts of willingness to fund the faults of the others so the simplest solution for the institutions in question will be to pass on the costs on depositors through an increase in service charges. Despite the fact that these "loans" will have to be repaid within fi ve years, I can imagine more profi table investments, which the institutions could do with free funds.
Already once proposed the single system for the whole European Union is, in my opinion, also the way in wrong direction. Although I think that the concept of the deposits insurance is very useful institute, the proposed system may have negative consequences. Generally I also do not share the Commission view that the legal forms diversity deforms the market. More likely reversely, for the subjects at the market there is nothing better than free competition in the provision of services of a large number of subjects. In my opinion, two situations can occur.
In one scenario the European fund can have suffi cient capital to help the problematic institutions. Despite this positive aspect, the concept could interfere with the market environment and lead to the laxity of the market operators. One of the key attributes to be evaluated by the potential bank client should be the ability of the institution to meet its obligations. In the proposed system he will have his money "sure", and so he need not to put emphasize on obtaining information on the institution and its fi nancial situation. In addition thereby the banks loose the element of external supervision. From the viewpoint of banks this increases the risk of moral hazard, because they can suppose that they contribute ex ante on ex post capitalization.
Th e opposite scenario, and in my opinion more likely, will be that the European fund will not have suffi cient capital. Due to the size of the banking sector in Europe, as I have stated earlier, it can be hardly imagined how high the charges should the bank contribute to the fund in order to cover defaults of the so called "too big to fail" bank. Th e ultimate consequence should be probably capitalization from the side of countries or their taxpayers. With respect to the fact that in the explanatory memorandums of almost all European initiatives in response to the actual crisis there is stated as the basic goal to pass on the burden of capitalization from taxpayers to the institutions, this model cannot be considered as too eff ective one. Moreover in general I suppose that even it is necessary to protect depositors in a certain measure, the regulation should not replace the vigilance of the market subjects namely in context of the already very signifi cant legislative hypertrophy.
Th e Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Th e federal deposit instance corporation was founded in 1933 by the "Banking Act" 34 , so it's the oldest deposit insurance scheme in the world. It is headed by the quinary Board of governors 35 and has a special position as an independent government agency that protects depositor's funds. Th e aim of this early creation was to prevent bank from failures because of the Great Depression. Th e main diff erence between the European Union and the United States approach is that the FDIC is responsible for both deposit guarantee and resolution schemes. Th e primary purposes of FDIC are to insure and protect the deposits of insured banks and to resolve failed banks. Deposits are divided into categories 36 within each of them depositors are insured up to 250 000 USD. In this regard there's a huge loophole in the amounts between mentioned regions. While in the EU there's a 100 000 EUR limit, in the United States it could be millions, if you are able to diversify your assets shrewdly.
FDIC or in particular its fond 37 is funded entirely by fees from member banks, savings associations and interest earnings on its investment portfolio of United States Treasury securities. No federal or state tax revenues are involved, although it is guaranteed indirectly by the taxpayers. As it is mentioned on the offi cial web: "FDIC deposit insurance is backed by the full faith and credit of the United States government". 38 Th is would be very interesting to see what would happen if such a situation occurred. Although it is written on an offi cial government website, there is no legal document that would make this promise binding. On the other hand there is an explicit legal provision that allows the United States Department of the Treasury (hereaft er "Treasury") to provide a line of 34 Th e statute is called as a banking act on the ground that its content is aimed at banking reforms in general. Th e legislation is also referred to as the "Glass-Steag all Act" aft er its proposers. In addition to the FDIC establishment, the main outcome of this Act was to ban commercial banks from an affi liation with security fi rms and security activities. credit up to 500 billion USD to the FDIC, which it has to repay over time. Th e last legislation 39 set the target ratio that has to be reached to 1, 35 % of the insured deposits 40 by the September of 2020. In accordance with the FDIC statement 41 , the aim should have to be reached even in 2018.
As in the EU the FDIC insures deposits only. It does not insure investments in stocks, bonds, mutual funds, life insurance policies, annuities, or municipal securities, even if a customer purchases them from an FDIC-insured bank or savings association. Treasury securities purchased by an insured depository institution on a client's behalf are not insured either.
Th e EU proposal is inspired in the United States law in the institute also known as "Living will". Th e law requires systemic nonbank fi nancial companies and large bank holding companies 42 to submit 43 a plan for their resolution in the event of fi nancial distress or default.
I have mentined above and contrary to the EU proposals in the United States there are newly 44 regulated and insured systematically important fi nancial institutions 45 as well. Th is means, apart from Credit Unions 46 which are not covered by the insurance, that the FDIC scope is much wider than in the EU. Th e decision to deem a failing fi nancial fi rm "systemic" will be made by the FDIC and Federal Reserve Board in conjunction with the Treasury. Aft er this co-decision it's up to FDIC solely, what will be done. In the event of a bank failure, the FDIC has two possible capacities.
Firstly, it has to pay insurance to the depositors up to the insurance limit. In the second phase, FDIC role can be described as the "receiver" of defaulted banks. It has to choose among options that were given to it by the law. Th e fi rst step is called as conservatorship and it means that Board of governors will replace the management. Th is is referred to as "prompt corrective action". Th an the Board can give binding instructions as follows: -Restructuring the bank as a "bad bank" and a "good bank". Th is powers are typically given to the authorities which supervise the bankruptcies. Furthermore FDIC is empowered to make a very quick decisions and most important, without the consent of the stakeholders. It's very oft en that bank shuts down on Friday and opens on Monday, aft er takeover. In general this is very important because the Board can intervene while the institution is undercapitalized but still solvent. In my opinion, this is one of the biggest diff erences in the aprroach in comparison with the EU. Th is decision in the EU has to make European Comission comprising of 28 diff erent state representatives. Th is will make the resolution process too slow and the decision will be politically aff ected. I think this is the biggest EU loophole at all decision-making processes. Th e outcome from that is very clear in fi gures.
FDIC numbers demonstrates that since 2008, 13 banks received FDIC support, while in the euro area and the rest of the EU, there are 50 cases of state aid support for euro-area banks, and 38 for the rest of the EU. 47 Since 2010, the FDIC has not started a new support Programme for any bank. Th e FDIC reports that 494 banks failed in the US from 2008 to 2013 48 . In Europe, there is no offi cial data source but unoffi cial estimates hovers in fi gures of 49 in the euro area and 64 in the rest of the EU. 49 Th is fi gure clearly shows how reluctant the EU and its bodies are.
Th e other big problem is the low equity 50 level in EU. Problem is that there is a very low interconnectivity within EU member states. Balance sheets of banks are huge compared to the GDP of states compared to the United States, but only on an individual level. EU states have to liquidate banks through the European Stability Mechanism (hereaft er as "ESM") 51 or cross-border consolidation. Only aft er that we can break the vicious circle between sovereigns and banks. Personally, I would prefer mergers. In my opinion it's the only way to liquidate bank without the state aid even though this would create even more "too big to fail" banks. Other ways are either insuffi cient, as in the case of Resolution fond, or inappropriate, as in the ESM case. By in-appropriation it is meant that this way of capitalizing in fact will rely on taxpayers. Nevertheless this system, build up on cross-border merges, is conceivable only with a strict single supervision and resolution mechanism in the whole European Union.
Conclusion
Th e European fi nancial system will have to pass very signifi cant changes if it wants to move out of the place. It is evident that Europe has only two possibilities how to continue. At fi rst the Europe will return one step or a few steps back. By this I mean abandonment of the single currency and return of some power back to the national authorities. Th e second possibility of the European Union is to integrate more. Now it is perhaps obvious even to the supreme representatives of EU, that the banking union and monetary union are not possible without the fi scal one. Th erefore fi rstly it is crucial to fi nd political consensus on the future of the Europe. Perhaps the most pressing problem of Europe, maybe with exception for the state defi cits, is banking sector and it's under-capitalization. At present nobody knows how much exactly the banks will need. It should be changed, currently ECB runs tests. Aft er evaluation it will be necessary to fi nd consensus in the sphere of the single resolution mechanism. But such a model should be found, which could be implemented across the whole EU, therefore to carry out in practice the merger of the so called second and third pillar of the Bank union. In this regard inspiration can be found in the United States. Th eir system is functional and operational. 52 It will be crucial, as it is in the United States, to fi nd operational authority or institution which will not be subjected to political pressure. It must be the authority that will be adequately empowered, but particularly it will be able to make decisions quickly, if possible, without the necessity of the creditors´ consent. I suppose that in the initial stage it will be better to let some bank fail. Although these steps will not be certainly politically popular, they are required for "market cleaning". What the United States already have gone through, the Europe is still expecting. Th e problem of Europe still insists in disability to act in a coordinated manner. Instead of that the debts of institutions and countries are "socialized" among the others. However the only result of such acting is putting off the problem until the future. Th is is the very expensively bought time, which moreover the Europe wasted to a large extent. I think that today it is already obvious that great part of this "loans" will never be repaid. What happens next it is diffi cult to estimate since the taxpayers' money also run out once. 
